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ABSTRACT In the smart environments several smart devices are continuously working together to
make individuals’ lives more comfortable. Few of the examples are smart homes, smart buildings, smart
airports, etc. These environments consist of many resource constrained heterogeneous entities which are
interconnected, controlled, monitored and analyzed through the Internet. One of the most challenging
tasks in a distributed smart environment is how to provide robust security to the resource constraint
Internet-enabled devices. However, an authentication can play a major role ensuring that only authorized
devices are being connected to the distributed smart environment applications. In this paper, we present a
robust and lightweight mutual-authentication scheme (RLMA) for protecting distributed smart environments
from unauthorized abuses. The proposed scheme uses implicit certificates and enables mutual authentication
and key agreement between the smart devices in a smart environment. The RLMA not only resists to
various attacks but it also achieves efficiency by reducing the computation and communication complexities.
Moreover, both security analysis and performance evaluation prove the effectiveness of RLMA as compared
to the state of the art schemes.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV), Internet of Things (IoT), implicit
certificate, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A smart environment is one of the emerging trends that allow
people and objects to stay connected via the information
and communication technologies. Smart environments (also
knows as Internet of Things (IoT)) include smart homes [1],
smart healthcare [2], smart car and cities [3] and many
more. Note that smart environments/objects and IoT appli-
cations/objects are interchanged throughout the paper. In a
recent research report, it is estimated that the “things” in
connected smart environments to grow tremendously and is
anticipated to reach up to billions of devices by 2025 [4].
In smart environment, IoT objects are computationally
constraint devices, such as sensors, that can sense, compute,
and extend connectivity between the last miles systems and
users via the Internet in a ubiquitous manner. Fig. 1 shows
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a typical network of distributed smart environments, where
several heterogeneous objects/nodes are installed to control
and monitor the applications through the IoT cloud. All the
sensors, objects or nodes collect data within their respective
environments and send it to the cloud via the networking tech-
nologies, e.g., Zwave, ZigBee, and other IoT protocols. The
collected data can be used for many purposes which depend
on an application of interest e.g., health monitoring, data
analytics for smart homes and cities [5], faults reporting in
a flight system, leakage alarm of chemical in a factory etc.
As data from IoT objects is precious, inadequate secu-
rity measures in IoT devices may invite various security
threats to the applications. An unauthorized data access may
cause harm to an application where the end-users are directly
involved. An attacker may exploit vulnerabilities in IoT
devices to collect data through eavesdropping, and may gain
financial profit by selling collected data. Moreover, recently
security researchers have pointed out several vulnerabilities
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FIGURE 1. Distributed smart environments: IoT home area network;
IoT-airport; IoT wireless sensor networks.
in smart cities technologies, few of them are attributed to
authentication flaws, thus leaving IoT applications unse-
cured [6]. Ali-Awad have pointed out various vulnerabilities
including lack of sufficient authentication in the smart home
technologies, and have claimed that these vulnerabilities may
pose many risks to the individuals [7].
In [8], security researchers have claimed that an attacker
can access several home routers (i.e., 1,700 IoT devices)
by exploiting a list of default login credentials on the IoT
devices. Stellios et al. have shown verified cyberattacks on
various IoT enabled domains, e.g., smart grid, intelligent
transport network, industrial control system, medical IoT,
and smart homes, etc. [9]. The authors have also claimed
that the vulnerabilities (e.g., design flaws in authentication
mechanism) in a smart light may lead to many threats in a
smart home. Moreover, a Dyn Attack is carried out by the
IoT Botnet named ‘Mirai’ which has seriously affected many
of IoT devices as claimed in [10]. Nevertheless, such lack of
sufficient authentication and/or design flaws in authentica-
tionmechanisms in IoT devices leads to sensitive information
or data breach which may be misused. Resultant, security has
been one of the main challenges in the success of distributed
smart environments and applications.
A. RELATED WORK
In order to provide security in smart environments, sev-
eral schemes have been proposed for smart environments or
IoT networks. Each scheme has own merits and demerits.
We have divided the related work into two parts namely:
(1) asymmetric and (2) symmetric key based schemes.
1) ASYMMETRIC KEY BASED SCHEMES
In [11], Sciancalepore et al. have proposed a keymanagement
protocol for IoT networks (IoTnet). The scheme is based
on the concept of Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)
and Elliptic CurveQu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificates.
The authors have claimed that their proposed scheme is
lightweight and secure against security attacks. However,
the threat model designed in this paper does not include many
popular attacks, such as impersonation, man-in-the-middle
(MITM), etc. As a consequence, their scheme may be incom-
petent to protect against impersonation and MITM attacks.
In addition, to execute the scheme (e.g., mutual authentication
phase), the system incurs high time complexities. Therefore,
this scheme may not be practical for resource-constrained
devices.
In [12], Porambage et al. have introduced introduced a
pair-wise key establishment scheme for wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs). The scheme uses ECC based implicit cer-
tificates for pair-wise key establishment. The authors first
performed the bootstrapping followed by establishment of
pair-wise key between nodes. However, physical capturing of
a node may lead to disclosure of authentication key, which
may emanate high security risks to other non-compromised
IoT applications.
Sciancalepore et al. [13] have implemented a public key
based authentication and key agreement protocol for IoTnet.
The authors have employed ECDH with ECQV implicit
certificates for achieving authentication. However, in their
scheme, 2 different keys are needed to operate the protocol
and the efficiency of key generation depends upon the key
derivation function. Hence, malfunctioning of KDF may lead
to connection abortion between entities. In their scheme,
future keys are generated with the use of master key and any
disclosure of related information may lead to loss of forward
secrecy.
Patel et al. have described an authentication and access
control protocol for IoT [14]. The scheme has used ECC
based mutual authentication (EMA) and capability based
access control (CBAC) for operation. Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and ECDH are used for gener-
ating and sharing the common secret keys for authentication.
In order to do this, the protocol utilized a plethora of cryp-
tosystem operations which make it compute expensive.
Hossain et al. [15] have proposed an authentication
technique, which is based on hardware and software
co-verification for IoT. The authors have pointed out that
since inception of IoT, targeting devices through cloning of
hardware has become easy. To address cloning issue, they
have proposed a physical unclonable function (PUF) based
security protocol. The proof-of-concept is implemented on
Contiki operating system. This method is claimed to be very
first attempt to prevent the IoT devices from cloning and
reprogramming attacks.
In [16], the authors proposed an authentication model for
IoT enabled smart home. The authors claimed that their
scheme is lightweight and secured against vulnerabilities.
The basic idea of this scheme is to utilize the concept of
temporary identity, keyed-hash chain mechanism and fog
computing to achieve mutual authentication and identity
assurance. Nevertheless, the schememay fail to provide com-
plete confidentiality and protection against DoS, known key
attacks etc. Moreover, the communication and computation
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cost in [16] is a hindrance to its acceptance as an authentica-
tion model for resource limited devices of smart homes.
Dey and Hossain [17] developed a model of authentica-
tion for smart homes. The authors emphasized the need of
a new security model for smart homes as distinct devices
with different computational abilities work altogether. Their
scheme exploited the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE)
protocol for achieving the mutual authentication and sharing
of key. The security strength of their scheme is evaluated on
protocol security analyzer tool AVISPA (automatic verifica-
tion of internet protocols and applications). However, in spite
of emphasizing on the computation and communication cost,
the scheme still incurred high complexities, fails to ensure
message freshness and may not withstand with known-key
attack.
2) SYMMETRIC KEY BASED SCHEMES
Kumar et al. have suggested a lightweight session key
establishment protocol for smart home environments [18].
A session key is produced using a short authentication token,
which uses the silicon chip-identity. The authors claimed their
scheme is efficient in terms of computation and communica-
tion costs and capable of protecting against attacks e.g., DoS,
eavesdropping, masquerade, message forgery. In addition,
their scheme satisfies the property of mutual authentica-
tion, session key establishment, confidentiality, integrity, and
freshness. However, the scheme may not resist time synchro-
nisation attacks. For instance, if clock loses synchronisation,
then the scheme is vulnerable to replay attack. Moreover,
anonymity and unlinkability issues are not addressed in the
scheme [19].
In another research [20], the authors have elaborated that
IoT networks have become a honeypot for attackers, thereby
turning the privacy of the individuals under threat. The ses-
sion key in their protocol is continuously renewed to prevent
replay attacks. However, the authors have introduced several
cryptosystem operations which made it bulky e.g. eight times
hashing operations.
Gope and Sikdar [21] have not only emphasized on vul-
nerability of IoT devices at public places but also realized
a need of robust IoT device authentication strategy. The
authors proposed an authentication model using PUF to make
IoT devices invulnerable to physical and cloning attacks.
Authors claimed that their scheme is resilient to imperson-
ation, achieves untraceability and also exhibit security prop-
erties e.g., mutual authentication, protection against physical
attacks etc. However, their scheme may incur high computa-
tion requirements due to massive use of hash operations and
high communication complexities. Thus, the scheme may not
pertinent for the resource constrained and sensitive applica-
tions of IoT.
In summary, most of the schemes are insufficient as they
are either not considering reasonable threat model that might
cause some security issues or incurring high complexities
at resource constrained nodes. Generally, the smart environ-
ments the objects triggers sensitive events where a packet
being sent over the network; while the content of the packet is
encrypted, knowing which device sends the packet reveals the
device identity (i.e., privacy issue). In the related work except
the scheme proposed in [20], a device therefore can easily be
traced because most of the schemes do not use the concept of
anonymity and/or untraceability to hide identities of nodes.
Thus, there is a necessity of an authentication scheme
(while providing privacy) which can protect the distributed
smart environments from unauthorized abuses with less com-
plexity and more robustness against attacks.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
• In this paper, we propose a robust and lightweight
mutual-authentication scheme (RLMA) for the dis-
tributed smart environments.
• To achieve the efficiency and lightweightness at resource
constrained nodes, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC),
implicit certificates, and symmetric encryption are used.
• The proposed scheme exhibits several security prop-
erties, such as mutual authentication, session key
agreement, message freshness and anonymity and/or
untraceability. Besides security properties, security
analysis also shows that the proposed scheme is
secure against many security attacks, e.g., replay, mes-
sage modification, node compromise, key compromise,
impersonation, known key, denial of service (DoS), and
man-in-the-middle (MITM).
• Performance evaluation (including energy efficiency)
and comparison demonstrates its high computational
and communicational efficiency as compared to the
state-of-the-art schemes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, ADVERSARY MODEL
AND SECURITY GOALS
A. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 2 depicts a high level system model in distributed smart
environment. The system model mainly consists of following
entities, such as IoT nodes, bi-directional communication
channel, certification authority, etc.
FIGURE 2. System model for authentication of IoT devices in smart
homes.
1) WSN-IoT Network: In a smart network, the resource-
constrained sensor nodes collect the data
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(e.g., humidity, light, etc.) from their respective
environments and send the data wirelessly to the
sink node via utilizing low-powered technologies,
e.g., ZigBee. More precisely, sensors data is easily
available from anywhere in an ad-hoc manner. From
the security perspective, the IoT nodes request security
credentials from the certificate authority. These secu-
rity credentials are later utilized to perform the mutual
authentication.
2) Certificate Authority (CA): The CA is a trusted entity,
and is responsible for generating and distributing
implicit certificates to the entities. Moreover, it is con-
sidered to be a tamper proof entity.
3) Communication Link: In the distributed IoT applica-
tions, IoT-nodes communicate with each other through
bi-directional wireless technologies, such as Zigbee,
Bluetooth, etc. In addition, the IoT nodes can com-
municate to CA either directly through GPRS/WiFi
functionality or via gateway and cloud.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
Following [22], consider a smart living environment where
an attacker can have full control of the IoT network, and can
modify, alter, drop and replay the wireless messages to mount
different attacks. More precisely, an adversary can replay
old messages with an intention to get unauthorized access
between two smart devices. An attacker can perform the
impersonation attack by creating the fake legitimate identity
to steal critical information from entities. An attacker can
disrupt the operations of the CA/IoT node through DoS and
MITM attacks.
C. SECURITY GOALS
The proposed scheme provides following security goals. Note
that the security goals are adopted from [20], [23].
1) Mutual authentication and session key establishment:
In IoT networks, each node should perform the
mutual authentication and verify the genuineness of
the requesting node. After performing the mutual
authentication, both the nodes should establish a ses-
sion key to secure the further communication.
2) Message integrity and freshness: Message integrity
ensures that no alteration has taken place during transit
of messages. The received data should be fresh to avoid
misinterpretation due to replaying of old messages.
3) Lightweightness: The devices in IoT networks are
resource constrained, so overhead must be reduced
during authentication and key establishment phase.
4) Safeguard to popular attacks: The proposed scheme
must be resistant to popular attacks like impersonation,
replay, node compromise, man-in-the-middle attack.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
Assume a distributed smart environment, for instance a smart
home (also known as a home area network (HAN)), which
consists of several WSN-IoT nodes. These nodes collect data
within a smart home and forward it to the IoT cloud and
to the user. In order to provide security in such application,
this section proposes a robust and lightweight authentication
scheme. Note that in order to run the proposed scheme (i) all
the entities are assumed to have identical cryptographic sys-
tems including encryption and hashing algorithms, (ii) each
certificate has its lifetime, e.g., a year. The proposed scheme
consists of three phases: system set-up phase, registration
phase, and authentication and key exchange phase.
TABLE 1. Symbols and descriptions.
A. SYSTEM SET-UP PHASE
In this phase, the CA off-line initializes the cryptographic
mechanisms (such as, EC, n, point generator, hash function,
symmetric encryption algorithm). Table 1 shows the nota-
tions and descriptions which are used throughout the paper.
Note that the background on ECC is omitted intentionally
due to the space limit. However, the interested may refer
to [24] for ECC details. The CA generates own public key
(QCA) and private key (dCA). In addition, it generates a key
pool of secret keys (e.g., KS1,KS2, . . .KSn) for the HANs
(HAN1,HAN2, . . .HANn). It then publishes EC, n, point
generator, QCA.
B. IoT-NODE REGISTRATION PHASE
In each home area network (HANi), an IoT node (e.g., nodeU)
needs to be registered to the CA and obtains security creden-
tials including a certificate and a key. The flow of registration
phase is depicted in Fig. 3 and described as follows:
1) Initially, the node U generates a random number rU and
computes RU = rUG. It then computes H1 = H (RU ||
U ) and M1 = EQCA[rU ,U ]. Finally, the node U sends
a cert-request message {M1,H1} to the CA.
2) Upon receiving cert-request, the CA decryptsM1 using
dCA and obtains rU ,U , and computes RU = rUG and
H1′ and verifies H1′ == H1. It then generates a
random number rCA and implicit certificate CertU =
RU + rCAG, computes e = H (CertU ), s = erCA + dCA
(mod n), H2 = H (CertU , s,LT ,KS1,RU ,U , IDCA),
Key = (rU ⊕ U ⊕ IDCA) and M2 = EKey[CertU ,
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FIGURE 3. Generation of implicit certificate.
s,LT ,KS1,RU ,U , IDCA]. Here, LT is the certificate
lifetime of node U. Finally, the CA sends cert-response
message {M2,H2} to the node U.
3) The Node U derives Key′ = (rU ⊕ U ⊕ IDCA)
decryptsM2 usingKey′ and obtainsCertU , s,LT ,KS1,
RU ,U , IDCA and stores them. Now it computes H2′
and verifiesH2′ == H2. Upon successful verification,
the node U computes own public and privacy keys from
the received implicit certificate, as follows:
dU = erU + s(mod n)
QU = dUG
= (erU + s(mod n))G
= (erU + erCA (mod n) + dCA (mod n) (mod n))G
= (erU + erCA (mod n) + dCA (mod n))G
= e(rU + rCA)G+ dCAG
= e(rUG+ rCAG)+ QCA
= e(RU + rCAG)+ QCA
QU = eCertU + QCA
C. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
EXCHANGE PHASE
The flow of mutual authentication and pair-wise key estab-
lishment is shown in Fig. 4. This phase invokes when two
nodes (node U and node V) want to negotiate a secret key
within a HAN.
FIGURE 4. Mutual authentication and pair wise key establishment.
1) In the proposed scheme, the node U initiates the com-
munication and it generates a random number nU ,
Key1 = (nU ⊕U ⊕ IDCA) and Token1 = HKey1(CertU ,
LT , nU ,U , IDCA). Here, HKey1 is a keyed-hash. Now,
it computes Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA], and
sends key-request {Token1, Z1} to the node V.
2) Upon receiving key-request message, the node V
decrypts Z1 using KS1, obtains CertU ,LT , nU ,U ,
IDCA. It first verifies the lifetime LT of the certificate
and IDCA of the CA. If these conditions are true then it
goes to the next step. In order to verify the authenticity
of node U, now the node V derives Key1′ and computes
Token1∗ and verifies Token1∗ == Token1. If this
condition fails then it aborts the session. Otherwise,
the node V computes node U’s public key as follows:
e = H (CertU ) and QU = eCertU + QCA. The proof
is as same as shown in the IoT node registration phase
(refer to step 3).
3) Now, the node V generates nV , Key2 = (nV ⊕
V ⊕ IDCA) and Token2 = HKey2(CertV ,LT , nV ,V ,
IDCA). Here, HKey2 is a keyed-hash. It computes Z2 =
EKS1[CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA]. It sends key-response
message {Token2,Z2} to the node U. Finally, the node
V computes a pair-wise key (KUV = dVQU ) using own
private key dV and U’s public key QU .
4) Upon receiving key-response message, the node U
decrypts Z2 using KS1, obtains CertV ,LT , nV ,V ,
IDCA. It first verifies the lifetime LT of the certificate
and IDCA of the CA. If these conditions are true then it
goes to the next step. In order to verify the authenticity
of node V, now the node U derives Key2′ and computes
Token2∗ and verifies Token2∗ == Token2. If fails then
it aborts the session. Otherwise, the node U computes
node V’s public key (QV ) and pair-wise key (KUV ) as
follows:
e = H (CertV ) and QV = dVG
= (erV + s(mod n))G
= (erV + erCA (mod n) + dCA(mod n)(mod n))G
= (erV + erCA (mod n) + dCA (mod n))G
= erV + rCA (mod n))G + dCAG
= e(rVG + rCAG) + QCA
= e(rV + rCA)G + QCA
QV = e(CertV ) + QCA
KUV = dUQV
Alternatively,KUV = dUdVG
The pair-wise key is established successfully.
IV. SECURITY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. FORMAL ANALYSIS
Following [18], [20], we utilize AVISPA (automatic verifica-
tion of internet protocols and applications) tool to evaluate
the security strength of the proposed RLMA against the
Dolev-Yao attack model. The AVISPA tool uses High Level
Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). The HLPSL
script is further translated to Intermediate format (IF) using
a HLPSL2IF translator [25]. The IF is feed to the backend,
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e.g., on-the fly model-checker (OFMC). For more details on
the backends, the reader may refer to [25]. Finally the back-
end generates the Output file (OF) concluding the protocol as
safe or unsafe.
The HLPSL script of a protocol always begins with the
basic roles. These roles are played by agents and contain local
declarations. It defines the transitions when certain events
are met and the corresponding changes in the states of the
node. On the other hand, composition role have no transition
section and executes various sessions in parallel. The last
role i.e. environment role is very significant as it declares
global constants and may composed of one or more sessions.
The knowledge of the intruder (i) is also declared in this
role and he may play some roles to camouflage profile of
legitimate users. The channel (dy) uses the Dolev-Yao (DY)
attack model for communication between the nodes.
To assess the strength of RLMA, the mutual authenti-
cation and pairwise key establishment phase is scripted in
HLPSL and tested on AVISPA. Initially, basic roles of node
U and V are defined which comprise of agent details (U, V),
crypto-operations, local declarations (Key1 etc.), channel
(dy), initial state and transitions. Due to HLPSL keyword
reservations, some of the parameters are represented with
different acronyms in AVISPA as compared to acronyms
used in algorithm. Those acronyms are i (intruder), IDU
(Identity of Node U), and IDV (Identity of Node V). Node
U acts as an initiator. After initialization at State = 0
[RCV(start)], it transitions to State = 1, where fresh
nonce is prepared, N ′u := new() followed by generation
of Token1′ = {Hash(Certu.Lt.Nu.Idu.Idca)}, and Z1′ =
{Certu.Lt.Nu.Idu.Idca}_Ks1. Node U sends Token1′ & Z1′,
(SND(Token1′,Z1′)) to Node V for accomplishing mutual
authentication and pair wise key establishment considering
same channel (dy) properties. The goal predicates set byNode
U is privacy of Certu & Nu′ as shown in Fig. 5.
Node V receives the Token1′ and Z1′ in its initial state,
State = 1 [RCV(Token1′,Z1′)] and extracts information dur-
ing 2nd State. Similarly, Node V sends Token2′,Z2′ to Node
U for successful accomplishment of mutual authentication
and key establishment as shown in Fig. 6. The message con-
fidentiality of Z2′ and authentication of Token2′ is modelled
in terms of goals predicate, secrecy {Certv,Nv} and witness
{nodeU_nodeV_lt} respectively. Witness ensures that the
lifetime (LT ) of the certificate (Certu) is verified before
use.
Likewise, Node U recovers the information from the
received message [RCV(Token2′,Z2′)]. Further, Node U at
State = 3, verifies (witness(U, V, nodeV_nodeU_lt, Lt)) the
validity ofCertv before processing the request of pairwise key
establishment.
Fig. 7 shows the composition of arguments used by agents,
nodeU (U ,V ,Hash,Qca,Key1,Key2,Ks1, SU ,RU )
/\nodeV (U ,V ,Hash,Qca,Key1,Key2,Ks1, SV ,RV )
These arguments are either sent or used by agents during the
session. The most important is environment role because it
constitutes of global constants declarations, defines intruder
FIGURE 5. Specification of the node U role.
FIGURE 6. Specification of the node V role.
FIGURE 7. Specification of the session role.
knowledge, elucify composition of sessions and set up goals
of interest. As per the Dolev-Yao attack model, intruder
is able to eavesdrop, intercept and analyze the informa-
tion for e.g., nodeU , nodeV , h, key1i, key2i, ks1i, qca. The
intruder knowledge is specified in environment and is
used by security protocol analyzer tool (OFMC, CL-AtSe)
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during vulnerability evaluation of protocol against attacks.
The next part of the environment role specifies the vari-
ous sessions of message exchanges among nodes. Though
it is expected to have sessions amongst legitimate agents
only (nodeU , nodeV , h, qca, key1, key2, ks1), but the pos-
sibility of intruder intervening in the session of legitimate
nodes also prevails (nodeU , i, h, qca, key1i, key2i, ks1i),
(i, nodeV , h, qca, key1i, key2i, ks1i). A total of four goals are
specified out of which two are associated to secrecy and rest
two corresponds to authentication as shown in Fig. 8. The
description of the goals are:
FIGURE 8. Specification of the goal and environment for the proposed
RLMA.
• Secrecy_of sub1 represents that {CertU ,NU} are kept
secret between node U and node V.
• Secrecy_of sub2 represents that {CertV ,NV } are kept
secret between node V and node U.
• Authentication_on nodeU_nodeV_lt states that the life-
time (i.e., LT ) of certificate {CertU} will be verified at
the Node V.
• Authentication_on nodeV_nodeU_lt states that the life-
time (i.e., LT ) of certificate {CertV } will be verified at
the Node U.
FIGURE 9. RLMA results using OFMC and CL-AtSe backend.
The robustness of proposed protocol against attacks is ver-
ified using OFMC backend. Fig. 9 illustrates that RLMA can
withstand against severe attacks and is reported safe to use in
Internet based applications. Likewise OFMC, the CL-AtSe
backend also reported safe. Hence, the attacks considered
in the DY attack model cannot harm the RLMA security
protocol.
B. INFORMAL PROOF
Following the attack model (as shown in Subsection II.B),
this subsection deals with the understanding of how the
designed protocol withstand against the attacks, such as
modification of messages, known key attack, impersonation
attack, replay, node compromise attack, etc.
Proposition: Secure against message modification.
Proof: Consider a communication between the
node U and V, where an attacker intercepts key − request
{Token1,Z1} and tries to fabricates Z1 to Z1′ using own
key. Then it sends Token1,Z1′ to the node V. Since, Z1′ is
computed via a wrong key (i.e., adversary key), it cannot be
decrypted at the legal node V . In addition, as Z1′ cannot be
decrypted, resultant Token1 cannot be verified. Note that here
Token1 is a keyed-hash (HKey1(CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA))
and the key is only generated by the legitimate nodes
using nU ,U , IDCA. Hence, message modification cannot
work from the node U to V communication. Likewise,
the key − response message is secure from the node V to
U communication.
Proposition: RLMA is safe against impersonation attack.
Proof: Impersonation attacks can be prevented by prop-
erly authenticating the nodes e.g., Node U, computes the
public key of Node V (QV ), using CertV and public key
of CA, QCA. Likewise, the node V computes the QU . Both
interested entities use their private keys (dU , dV ) and opposite
entity public Key (QU ,QV ) for generating the session key
{Node U ,KUV = dUQV ; Node V ,KUV = dVQU }. The
process guarantees the execution of same secret keys at both
entities when the certificates are issued by the valid CA. Node
U, can trust the received certificate if it is encrypted by secret
key (Key = rU ⊕ U ⊕ IDCA), which is exchanged between
CA and node U. Therefore, impersonation attacks are diffi-
cult to conduct in RLMA as nodes among themselves use
keyed-hash based Token approach for mutual authentication.
Proposition: RLMA is resistant to node compromise
attack.
Proof: It is widely accepted that smart devices are diffi-
cult to prevent if they are not tamper proof [20]. Assume if the
attacker captures the node and tries to collect the information.
The information may constitute of a Certificate (CertN ). As,
each certificate has its lifetime and unique nonce, the mis-
use of a compromised node can be prevented. In a smart
home (i.e., HAN), as every node is embedded with unique
id, certificate and KS1, thus compromising these parameter
cannot compromise the security of non-compromised HANs.
Therefore, the proposed scheme addresses security against
node compromise attack to some level.
Proposition: Secure against Known key attack.
Proof: Known-key attack means that if a session is
compromised then it should not compromise other session
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keys. In our scheme, suppose an attacker tries to generate a
pair-wise session key (KUV ). However, this key does not help
to deduce the key of other sessions since the pair-wise key is
being computed over a nonce (N) and a high entropy random
number (r). Note that these parameters are independent and
different for each session. More precisely, a fresh random
number guarantees that the certificate is unique for each node
{(RU = rUG), (CertU = RU + rCAG)} which further certify
that generation of session key, {KUV = dU (e(CertV+QCA)} is
independent and distinct for every session, thereby protecting
the protocol against known key and ephemeral secret leakage
attacks.
Proposition: Resilient to MITM attack.
Proof: The attacker node may have eavesdropped the
messages exchanged between nodes and CA or between
nodes. The attacker may have intentions to disrupt the system
by retrieving the information as a middle agent and relay it
after modifying. The attacker needs dCA and EKey to compute
{EKey, [CertU , s,LT ,RU ,U ]}, which he would never be able
to get as dCA is the private key of CA and never shared over
the medium, thus attacker would not be able to modify the
authenticator messages of RLMA. Moreover, the legitimate
devices are mutually authenticated, KUV = dV dUG with the
secret key (KUV , never shared over medium), hence it would
not be possible for an attacker to launch MITM.
Proposition:RLMA is resistant to Denial-of-service (DoS)
and to replay attack.
Proof: Protecting a network from denial-of-service
attacks is very hard as it can be mounted at every layer
in a smart environment. However, a replay attack is one of
them that can degrade the smart environment performance
severely [26]. For instance, in the proposed scheme – sup-
pose an adversary (A) eavesdrops and intercepts the valid
messages {Token1, Z1} and {Token2,Z2} between the node
U and V. Later adversary tries to replay {Token1,Z1} to
node V to keep the node V busy. However, this attempt
fails as Token1 = HKey1 (CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA) and
Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA] contains a fresh nonce
(nU ), which is utilized to protect against replay attack. Sim-
ilarly, the attacker intercepts the valid message {Token2,
Z2} and later replay’s to node U. This attempt fails as
Token2 = HKey2(CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA) and Z2 =
EKS1[CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA] utilize nonce (nV ). Hence,
a replay attempt is detected very easily at node U. Moreover,
nonce cannot be modified as it is shielded with KS1 and
keyed-hash with SHA-1. Therefore, the proposed scheme is
safeguard to a replay attack, and to a DoS attack to some
extend (i.e., a partial protection against DoS).
Proposition: RLMA attained Mutual Authentication.
Proof: The main purpose of mutual authentication is to
cease the unauthorized access of intruders into the network.
In our approach, mutual authentication is carried out between
two nodes as follows:
• U → V : Token1,Z1;
Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA]
Key1 = (nU ⊕ U ⊕ IDCA)
Token1 = HKey1 (CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA)
• U ← V : Token2,Z2;
Z2 = EKS1[CertV , LT , nV ,V , IDCA]
Key2 = (nV ⊕ V ⊕ IDCA)
Token2 = HKey2(CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA)
Upon receiving key − request from node U, the node V
decrypts Z1′ and computes Key1′, Token1∗ and verifies
Token1∗ == Token1, for mutual authentication. Successful
verification clearly indicate the legitimacy of node U. Simi-
larly, node U verifies the authenticity of node V by evaluating
Token2. As keyed-hash is a one way function, so Token2
cannot be reversed. Therefore, unauthorized nodes can never
read the content of HKey2(CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA).
Proposition:Message freshness.
Proof: The proposed protocol ensures the presence of
freshness component in messages through nonces (N) and
ephemeral random numbers (r). The freshness not only pro-
tects against the replay and DoS attacks but also restricts the
entities to prevent wastage of the resources in processing the
old requests e.g., one or more components (nU , nV , rU ,RU )
of the freshness is added in every single exchange of message,
e.g., U ↔ CA, U ↔ V ,
• {EQCA [rU ,U ]}||H (RU ||U ) (∵ RU = rUG)
• Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA]
• Token2 = HKey2(CertV ,LT , nV ,V , IDCA)
The expressions prove the attainment of freshness property.
Proposition: Secure session key agreement.
Proof: The key agreement can be observed in the
expression:
• Node U: KUV = dUQV ; QV = eCertV + QCA;
Z2 = EKS1[CertV , LT , nV ,V , IDCA]
CertV = RV + rCAG
• Node V: KUV = dVQU ; QU = eCertU + QCA;
Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA]
CertU = RU + rCAG
where LT ensures the expiry of the certificate and in turn
session after a certain time period. Hence, new key will
be formed for each session. Moreover it can be observed
that the certificates are not sent in plaintext, thereby obtain-
ing security of the parameters used for key establishment.
In addition RU and RV , will be different for each session
which guarantees a different KUV for every session. In this
way, a secure session key agreement is provided between the
node U and V.
Proposition: RLMA procured the property of anonymity
and/or untraceability.
Proof: Untraceability can be achieved by keeping the
identity of the device hidden [27]. Attacker usually tries
to track the device by eavesdropping of messages. In the
RLMA, the ID’s of the devices are not sent in plaintext,
thereby it will be hard to trace the communicating parties,
e.g., Z1 = EKS1[CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA], and Token1 =
HKey1(CertU ,LT , nU ,U , IDCA), are shared by node U with
nodeV. The information contains the ID’s, which is encrypted
to ensure that adversary could not find a way to decode
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the identities of the devices in communication. Therefore,
the proposed protocol ensures the untraceability of entities.
TABLE 2. Analysis and comparison of protocols based on protection
against attacks and security properties.
Finally, we summarize the security features of RLMA
and compare its security with the state-of-the-art schemes.
Table 2 shows that protocol proposed in [13], is prone to
node compromise attack. More precisely, a single node com-
promises may lead to several attacks to the whole network.
Other protocols (e.g., [14]–[17]) are subjected to known key
attack. The schemes presented in [14] is vulnerable to imper-
sonation attacks. In addition, it can be noticed that most of
the state-of-the-art schemes do not consider the property of
anonymity and/or untraceability, which is paramount require-
ment in many of smart environments use-cases where privacy
is equally important, such as smart healthcare monitoring.
In summary, it can be observed fromTable 2 that the proposed




We experimented a prototype of RLMA scheme on a
TelosB mote/device powered by TinyOS. Here, a TelosB
mote equipped with a 16 bit processor (i.e., Texas Instru-
ments MSP430 processor) that runs at a clock frequency
of 8 MHz having 48 KB and 10 KB of ROM and RAM
respectively [28]. We built a network of two TelosB nodes,
i.e., node U and node V and a laptop (Configuration:
Intel core i3-2310M processor with clock frequency and
RAM of 2.10 GHz and 4 GB respectively). For the exper-
imental purpose, we utilized a rich set of cryptographic
libraries including AES (Advanced Encryption Standard),
one-way hash function (i.e., SHA-1) and TinyECC [29].
In our experiment, we use the following message sizes, for
instance IDs = 1 byte, hashing = 20 bytes, pseudo random
number = 4 bytes, lifetime = 4 bytes, certificate =
16 bytes, s = 20 bytes, nonce = 4 bytes, and symmetric key
size = 16 bytes. Therefore, the total length of messages in
RLMA, i.e., key-request and key-response are 46 bytes each.
B. EVALUATION OF RLMA
We evaluated the performance of RLMA considering compu-
tation, communication and energy prices for the authentica-
tion and key establishment phase.
1) COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
As shown in Fig. 4, the Node U initiates the communication
and sends aKey-request packet to the node V, which is further
connected to the server, i.e., the laptop. Moreover, the node U
receives (i.e., a Key-response) from the node V. Nevertheless,
the total execution time taken by Node U is 1177.33 ms,
for performing mutual authentication and key establishment
with Node V , as shown in Fig. 10. We further evaluate the
execution time for individual cryptographic operations. As as
shown in Table 3, SHA-1, AES-encryption, AES-decryption,
and multiplication take 112.32 ms, 16.38 ms, 178.10 ms,
and 870.53 ms, respectively. This computation time can be
reduced by using more high class smart devices, e.g., rasp-
berry pi. However, in terms of the key establishment time,
it is a well-suited time for the resource-constrained devices
in smart environments.
FIGURE 10. Time elapsed for mutual authentication and key
establishment.
We further evaluated energy-efficiency for the crypto-
graphic operations as the smart objects are battery pow-
ered devices in many of use-cases. Following the formula
(i.e., {E = V × I × t}) used in [14], we calculated the
energy prices for our cryptographic operations. Here, V, I and
t are the voltage, current and execution time, respectively.
We have adopted the values of V = 3V and I = 1.8mA
from [30]. The value of ‘t’ for RLMA is measured from the
experiment, as shown in Table 3. On a battery-powered smart
69730 VOLUME 8, 2020
G. S. Gaba et al.: RLMA Scheme in Distributed Smart Environments
TABLE 3. Execution time and energy costs.
device, the total energy required for the proposed RLMA
is 6.356 mJ. More precisely, Table 3 also demonstrates the
total energy incurred by RLMA for executing individual
cryptographic operations, e.g., hash, encryption, decryption,
and multiplication are 0.606 mJ , 0.088 mJ , 0.961 mJ , and
4.701 mJ , respectively.
TABLE 4. Computation cost comparisons.
In addition, a comparison of the computation cost among
state-of-the-art schemes is presented in Table 4. Note that we
simply chose asymmetric key based schemes for the compar-
ison purposes. For the convenience of evaluation, following
notations are being used:
• H: the time for performing a hash operation.
• MAC: the time for performing a MAC operation.
• HMAC: the time for performing a HMAC operation.
• E: the time for performing an encryption operation.
• D: the time for performing an decryption operation.
• S: the time for performing a signature operation.
• M: the time for performing a multiplication operation.
It can be seen from Table 4, the proposed RLMA
makes use of 2 hash operations, 1 time encryption (E) &
decryption (D), and 1 time multiplication operation for
executing the mutual authentication and key establish-
ment between the node U & V. Whereas the schemes pro-
posed in [13], [15]–[17] makes use of excessive hash,
MAC, HMAC, signatures, encryption, decryption and mul-
tiplication operations, which may not be efficient for the
resource-hungry nodes. In addition, the scheme proposed
in [14] incurred less computations than the proposed RLMA
but does not provide adequate security services as shown
in Table 2.
TABLE 5. Communication energy costs.
2) COMMUNICATION COST
To investigate the communication cost, we have evaluated
the energy required to transmit/receive the key-request and
key-responsemessages between the nodeU and V. Following
the scheme proposed in [18], transmitting and receiving a bit
on TelosB consumes 0.72 × 10−3mJ and 0.81 × 10−3mJ
of energy, respectively. Therefore, to send a key-request
(i.e., 368 bits) to node V, the node U requires 0.264 mJ .
Likewise, to receive a key-response (i.e., 368 bits) from node
V, the node U needs 0.298 mJ energy. The total energy
required for communication by RLMA is 0.562 mJ as shown
in Table 5 and it can also be noticed that the proposed scheme
incurred less communication energy than the other schemes.
FIGURE 11. Communication cost comparisons in terms of the number of
message exchanges.
Finally, from Fig.11, it is easy to visualize that a prac-
tical authentication and key establishment in the proposed
scheme requires 2 message exchanges, whereas the schemes
proposed in [14], [16] require 4 message exchanges and
the scheme proposed in [13], [15], [17] needs 6, 3, and
7 message exchanges respectively. It should be noted that
in real-world applications the actual number of message
exchanges may vary if the packet transmission required
multi-hop communications.
Considering computational, communication and node
energy costs, it is clear that the proposed RLMA is efficient
compared to other related schemes.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a robust and lightweight
mutual-authentication (RLMA) scheme for the distributed
smart environments. RLMA utilized implicit-certificate to
achieve its simplicity and efficiency. The accomplishment of
the security goals (i.e., secrecy, authentication, and message
freshness) of the proposed scheme has been proven through
formal (AVISPA) and informal analysis. We have demon-
strated, through the performance evaluation, that RLMA
is robust against attacks, consumes less computation and
communication energy costs. All these properties make the
RLMA suitable for the next generation smart home area
networks. As future work, the authors plan to extend the
proposed model to support authentication between users and
devices in Internet of Things environment.
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